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1  |  INTRODUC TION
The barrier theory of oncogenesis (Ewald and Swain Ewald, 2013) 
offers an evolutionary framework based on the conflicts of interest 
between a cell acting in its own short- term reproductive interest and 
the evolutionary fitness of the multicellular organism in which the 
cell resides. It proposes that the diverse and complex interactions 
of oncogenesis within a person and among cancers can be usefully 
organized by identifying the few cellular processes that block a cell's 
pathway to cancer (e.g., cell cycle arrest and cell suicide). These 
barriers are distinguished from the many restraints that may slow 
but do not block oncogenesis (e.g., slow division of dividing cells, 
restricted blood flow). These distinctions allow the essential causes 
of cancer, which circumvent barriers, to be distinguished from the 
many exacerbating causes, which compromise restraints. Oncogenic 
viruses evolve to circumvent barriers to cancer because barriers to 
cancer are also barriers to the survival and reproduction of viral ge-
nomes within the cell.
The distinction between barriers and restraints can be applied 
more broadly to any situation in which there are conflicts of interest 
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Abstract
We propose a general barrier theory as an evolutionary framework for understand-
ing coevolutionary effects of conflicts of interest in natural and human systems. It 
is generalized from the barrier theory of cancer, which describes how cancer devel-
ops through the evasion of mechanisms, that block unregulated cellular reproduction 
and survival. Barriers are naturally evolved or artificially implemented mechanisms 
for blocking exploitation; restraints are mechanisms that impede but do not block 
exploitation. When conflicts of interest arise, selection will favor exploiters that 
are capable of overcoming barriers and restraints. When barriers are in place, they 
halt, at least temporarily, coevolutionary arms races (the Red Queen can stop run-
ning). Barriers occur in a broad spectrum of interactions characterized by conflicts 
of interest: barriers to cellular survival (apoptosis) and reproduction (cell cycle arrest) 
may block a virus from replicating its genome through reproduction of its host cell. 
Vaccines may completely protect against targeted pathogens. A plant may escape 
herbivory by evolving defensive chemicals that block herbivory. Obligate mutualisms 
may evolve when barriers to horizontal transmission favor symbionts that increasingly 
lose mechanisms that contribute to horizontal transmission. Here, we show how the 
barrier theory applies across a spectrum of natural and social systems.
K E Y W O R D S
barrier theory, coevolution, evolutionary ecology, evolutionary medicine, exploitation, Red 
Queen
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and possibilities for exploitation and for defenses against exploita-
tion. The extent to which barriers can be maintained over time spec-
ifies conditions in which coevolutionary arms races can be halted. 
This implies either the creation of a new evolutionarily stable strat-
egy or of the loss of an arms race; the coevolutionary relationship 
will not restart unless a strategy is developed for evading the barrier.
Van Valen (1973) focused on how this ongoing antagonistic 
coevolutionary process could lead to regularity in rates of species 
extinctions. Building on Hamilton’s (1980) idea that sexual reproduc-
tion could allow hosts to stay ahead of parasites in their evolutionary 
arms races, Bell (1982) expanded the Red Queen concept to fluctu-
ations in the success of genetic variants as an explanation for the 
evolutionary maintenance of sexual reproduction. These and subse-
quent applications of the Red Queen hypothesis to the evolution of 
sex have emphasized genotype oscillations over time (Kouyos, 2007; 
Lively, 2010), but cyclic dynamics are not necessary for the continu-
ation of the coevolutionary process; genetic diversity per se can be 
sufficient (Ashby, 2020; Lively, 2010), and the process can involve 
directional selection (Brockhurst et al., 2014).
We consider the Red Queen broadly to include any coevolu-
tionary process through which the interactants are persistently 
changing in response to each other. These processes could involve 
cycles of allele and genotype frequencies or ongoing coevolution-
ary changes that are not cyclic. Noncyclic changes could occur 
when the defenses are beneficial because offspring differ from the 
parents or siblings that can transmit exploiters (Aubier et al., 2020; 
Greenspoon and Mideo, 2017), or as a result of epidemiological in-
fluences (MacPherson & Otto, 2018).
The barrier theory helps to structure the overall applicability of 
the Red Queen hypothesis because ongoing cyclic dynamics result 
when defenses against exploitation are restraints— the defenses 
suppress rather than block the antagonist. If the coevolutionary 
changes are not cyclic, the defenses could be restraints if the ge-
netic variation to overcome the defense is present in the exploitative 
population, or barriers if the exploiter population does not have the 
genetic information needed to counter the defense. In the latter 
case, the exploiter population could become extinct or switch to an-
other population of the same or different species. Or the exploiter 
could persist in the original population but be unable to exploit the 
host in a way that is blocked by the barrier (e.g., a virus unable to 
stimulate host cell proliferation because of a cell cycle arrest bar-
rier may be able to replicate is genome through by virion production 
but not through cellular replication). If the ability to break through 
the barrier is subsequently generated (e.g., through a new mutation), 
then the newly acquired ability transforms the barrier into a restraint 
and coevolutionary process can resume. These processes are dia-
grammed in Figure 1. The literature on the Red Queen hypothesis 
focuses on restraints rather than barriers. Consideration of barriers, 
however, is important because it frames the conditions under which 
the Red Queen processes will or will not be occurring (as noted by 
the asterisk in Figure 1). Restraints keep the Red Queen running, 
whereas barriers allow her to stop, at least temporarily.
We suggest, using illustrations from a spectrum of exploitative 
relationships, that both barriers and restraints are widespread in nat-
ural and cultural systems, though in the latter, the information will 
be social or acquired, rather than genetic (Borgerhoff Mulder et al., 
2006; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). In each context, barriers evolve, in 
the genetic or cultural sense, to prevent exploitation. Just as the bar-
rier theory of oncogenesis implies prolonged, complex coevolution-
ary relationships between hosts and oncogenic viruses, selection is 
similarly likely to favor strategies for thwarting exploitation in and 
among free- living organisms, and counterstrategies for overcoming 
such defenses. As is the case with the barrier theory of oncogene-
sis, a barrier to exploitation among free- living organisms stops the 
coevolutionary process (Figure 1), and breaking of the barrier is an 
essential cause of the restarting of the coevolutionary process. As is 
the case with oncogenesis, countermeasures against restraints are 
exacerbating causes that perpetuate the coevolutionary process; 
they exacerbate the exploitation and hence increase the selective 
pressure on the exploited individual to evolve additional protection.
Several claims follow from these arguments, if valid: First, barrier 
theory, as applied to different ecological and cultural environments, 
F I G U R E  1  The general barrier theory 
of coevolution. The compromising of 
barriers here is assumed to be due to 
mutations but could be generated by 
other means, for example, in the process 
of cultural evolution. The asterisk 
indicates where the Red Queen (broadly 
defined) continues to run. See text for 
further explanation
    |  3GOODMAN AND EWALD
will allow for predictions of how exploitation is likely to arise be-
tween competitive individuals or populations (for discussion of par-
allels between oncologic systems and other ecological and social 
systems, see Aktipis et al., 2015; Aktipis, 2020). Second, deception 
and mimicry are likely to be common forms of breaking or overcom-
ing barriers. Third, in human systems, as cultures become larger and 
more stratified, both the strategies for exploitation and the barri-
ers for preventing them will become more complex. We discuss the 
relevance of this perspective in parasite/host systems, nonhuman 
animal signaling systems, and human social systems.
2  |  PAR A SITISM
Oncogenic viruses may have evolved to evade barriers because 
this ability increases the chances that the viruses can multiply per-
sistently through proliferation of their host cells (Ewald and Swain 
Ewald, 2013). The countermeasures that tumor viruses evolved 
against barriers to oncogenesis transformed the barriers into re-
straints on both oncogenesis and viral persistence. More generally, 
when parasites evolve countermeasures that compromise but do 
not eliminate barriers to exploitation, the barriers become restraints 
for those parasites. This situation accords with the need for the Red 
Queen to begin moving to improve the effectiveness of a restraint 
on exploitation and, if possible, transform a restraint back into a bar-
rier against the coevolving parasite.
Vaccination can be a barrier when the genetic variation in the 
target pathogen population is insufficient to generate vaccine es-
cape (e.g., smallpox vaccination). When sufficient variation for vac-
cine escape is present, the vaccination is a restraint (e.g., influenza 
vaccination). In some cases, vaccination could be a restraint that 
fundamentally changes the coevolutionary landscape; for example, 
diphtheria vaccination is barrier against phage- encoded toxin but a 
restraint for the C. diphtheriae that host the phage, resulting in pre-
domination by nontoxigenic Corynebacterium diphtheriae that are 
relatively benign for humans (Ewald, 1994).
Genetic defenses against parasites generally are restraints. The 
allele that causes sickle cell anemia, for example, reduces the mortal-
ity from infections with the malaria parasite, Plasmodium falciparum, 
among people who are heterozygous for the allele by suppressing 
the reproduction of P. falciparum, but the allele does not prevent dis-
ease or infection (Archer et al., 2018). Genetic defenses against par-
asites can sometimes be barriers, however. Plasmodium vivax uses 
the Duffy antigen receptor to enter cells (Salinas and Tolia, 2016). 
Mutations in this receptor therefore block the entry of Plasmodium 
vivax (Salinas and Tolia, 2016). The effectiveness of this barrier may 
explain the absence of P. vivax from areas in West Africa where the 
Duffy antigen receptor is highly prevalent. This negative correlation 
between the prevalence of P. vivax and the Duffy antigen mutation 
may have arisen because P. vivax was once common in Western 
Africa, but virtually disappeared when the prevalence of the re-
ceptor mutation increased to near fixation. Some P. vivax strains, 
however, have evolved a workaround, so that individuals with the 
receptor mutation can be infected (Golassa et al., 2020), abrogating 
the barrier and restarting a local evolutionary arms race between 
humans and P. vivax in individuals who carry the Duffy antigen re-
ceptor mutation.
Studies of immunological defenses against parasitism generally 
focus on the action of immunological defenses against specific par-
asitic organisms. Evolutionarily these interactions are often viewed 
in the context of arms races, with immunological adaptations such 
as leukocyte clonal diversity, antigen presentation, and somatic hy-
permutation being interpreted as adaptations that allow facultative 
responses to rapidly evolving adversaries. The flip side of these 
immunological responses is that they block a great spectrum of 
micro- organisms that would otherwise rapidly multiply and damage 
the host. Opportunistic infections in immunologically compromised 
hosts, for example, reveal the importance of immunological barri-
ers to potentially damaging micro- organisms. The distinction be-
tween barriers and restraints is therefore central to understanding 
the function of the immune system because viewing immunological 
defenses solely in the context of the coexisting parasites that are 
inhibited but not blocked by the defenses would understate the se-
lection pressure favoring the defense and the benefit of the defense 
to the host.
Knowledge about the Duffy antigen receptor illustrates this 
point. The functional Duffy antigen receptor is involved in immuno-
logical signaling and the coagulation response to bacterial lipopoly-
saccharide (Mayr et al., 2009). Evidence indicates that the absence 
of the Duffy antigen on red blood cells may dampen the coagulation 
response to bacteria and inhibit tumor development and metastasis 
(Pruenster et al., 2009). If evolutionary considerations of the muta-
tions were focused only on their altering responses to coagulation 
and cancer, the most dramatic effect would have been overlooked: 
their role in creating a barrier to infection by P. vivax. Although this 
effect was apparent to malaria researchers considering genetic de-
fenses across geographic regions, the effects of barriers may often 
be inconspicuous because the parasites that are blocked by the bar-
rier are only apparent by their absence. A researcher studying the 
Duffy antigen mutation only in West Africa might fail to notice its 
effect on P. vivax because this parasite, being blocked by the muta-
tion, is not present in the study population. The effects of a barrier 
in other situations may go unnoticed if researchers do not consider 
why potential exploiters are not exploiting in a given system.
3  |  PREDATION AND HERBIVORY
A major category of interactions in nature involves interactions be-
tween free- living consumers and consumed species. This category 
encompasses interactions between herbivores and plants, and pred-
ators and their prey. Defenses against consumers often involve sec-
ondary chemicals or physical structures. A particular defense may 
be a stable barrier against most consumers but a restraint for small 
subset of coevolving consumers. Defensive chemicals of pine trees, 
for example, are barriers for most herbivorous insects. Dendroctenus 
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pine beetles, however, have evolved adaptations that not only coun-
ter the defenses but also to use the chemicals to home in on vul-
nerable trees and as a basis for their pheromonal communication; 
these adaptations allow the beetles to engage in concerted beetle 
attacks on the trees (Franceschi et al., 2005; Tittiger & Blomquist, 
2017). The pine beetles have apparently gained the upper hand in 
the coevolutionary arms race, so that the chemical defenses are no 
longer a deterrent even though they certainly must continue to be 
an effective barrier against a large number of herbivorous insects.
The current deforestation of conifers suggests how a change in 
the environment, in this case due to global warming, can change the 
outcome of coevolutionary interactions when barriers have been cir-
cumvented. Global warming has apparently shifted the associations 
from Red Queen coexistence to decimation of the conifer forests 
by reducing resistance of trees and lengthening the season suitable 
for beetle reproduction (Bentz et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2020). This 
decimation has not been attributed to opportunistic herbivores, for 
which the chemical defenses still function as barriers.
As is the case with the Duffy antigen mutations, the importance 
of the secondary compounds need to be analyzed not only in the 
context of the coevolutionary arms race between the pines and the 
beetles, but also in the context of the herbivores that do not exploit 
the pine trees because they are entirely deterred by the secondary 
compounds. This deterrence may be the main explanation for why 
the investment in secondary compounds is favored by natural selec-
tion. Considerations of plant– herbivore arms races by focusing on 
herbivores that restrained but not blocked may therefore provide an 
inadequate understanding of how natural selection favors the evo-
lution of secondary compounds.
4  |  MUTUALISMS
The barrier theory is also applicable to the evolution of mutualisms. 
One application involves modes of transmission of symbionts, de-
fined broadly here to include any organism living in intimate asso-
ciation with a host organism, inclusive of parasites, mutualists, and 
commensals. If a parasite loses its ability to be horizontally transmit-
ted and is thus transmitted only vertically from parent to offspring, 
its genetic interest coincides with that of its host. When horizon-
tal transmission is no longer possible, any of the additional adap-
tations for horizontal transmission become a liability and thus will 
be selected against and attributes that benefit the hosts will be se-
lected for. The genetic concordance of interests between vertically 
transmitted symbiont and host should favor further adaptations of 
the symbiont that benefit the host and vice versa, leading to ever 
stronger obligate mutualisms, such as the evolution of organelles. Of 
course, when this process begins, horizontal transmission could be 
reinstated by compensatory mutations, but the variety of mutations 
that can result in the disintegration of the potential for horizontal 
transmission will be greater than the number that can reinstate it. 
Consequently, we can expect that the evolutionary trajectory after 
the loss of horizontal transmission will tend to be toward more 
robust barriers to horizontal transmission and increasingly mutual-
istic interactions so long as there are benefits that the symbiont can 
provide to the host.
If the dividing line between parasitism and mutualism (i.e., com-
mensalism; see Swain Ewald and Ewald, 2020) is not crossed, a ver-
tically transmitted parasitic lineage will become extinct because the 
costs inflicted by the parasite on the host will lower host fitness below 
that of unparasitized competitors. If the process begins with a mar-
ginal mutualism instead of parasitism, loss of horizontal transmission 
will favor mutualisms that generate ever greater net benefits to the 
host up to the maximum net benefit, without the time constraint 
imposed by extinction of a parasitic lineage that is entirely vertically 
transmitted. Regardless of the starting point, an insurmountable bar-
rier to horizontal transmission of mutualists allows the Red Queen to 
stop. Accordingly, chloroplasts and mitochondria have never, to our 
knowledge, evolved to be parasitic. Overall, barriers to horizontal 
transmission are barriers to host exploitation that increase in strength 
as a result of ever greater specialization for vertical transmission.
5  |  NONHUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Vertical and horizontal information transmission apply similarly in 
the social systems of both nonvertebrates, bird species, and primates 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Whiten, 2021). Accordingly, barriers may 
shift from purely biological to cultural, depending on the population 
in question. Yet because of the way information is transferred in so-
cial systems— notably by imitation and learning (Boyd & Richerson, 
1985)— the modes of both barrier formation and exploitation are 
different in kind from those of biological systems. In social systems, 
where signals and cues are used by individuals to predict the behav-
iors of others (Grafen, 1990; Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Zahavi, 1975) 
and may evolve through cultural evolution as well as biological evo-
lution (Owren et al., 2010), honest and dishonest signals will provide 
the information essential for predicting and blocking exploitation. As 
in purely biological ecologies, the risk of detection and the associated 
costs of being detected form the costs to mimics.
In nonhuman animals, mimicry of honest signals can be used to 
exploit social systems, creating a need for social policing (Maynard- 
Smith and Harper, 2003), which may act as a barrier or restraint on 
signal mimicry. The difficulty of replicating the signal in question is, 
furthermore, a restraint, where at the far extreme— where a signal is 
not fakeable (referred to variously as a “performative signal” or an 
“index”; Maynard- Smith and Harper, 2003). Selection will favor both 
mimics capable of imitating hard to fake signals, as well as individuals 
capable of detecting fakery.
For example, in an empirical iteration of the Sir Philip Sydney 
Game, young, related birds in a single nest use varying calling strat-
egies in an attempt to win a feeding parent's attention (Hutteger 
and Zollman, 2010; Jamie et al., 2020; Maynard- Smith, 1994). Chicks 
that express a greater need for food are more likely to be fed by the 
adults, though a particular calling strategy does not necessarily indi-
cate a greater need for food.
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Exploitation is, in this case, when a chick signals a need for food 
when there is no such need, thereby mimicking those with a real 
need; countermeasures against such exploitation are employed by 
parents that preferentially respond to honest signalers. Insofar as 
a parent can always recognize and avoid a cheating chick, this abil-
ity to perceive correctly is a barrier to cheating; honest signals of 
need would, in this case, be an index. If, however, recognition is only 
sometimes successful, the response would be a restraint. Where 
cheating is observed, we would expect that chicks that need food 
would signal more desperately, and, further, that parents would have 
a high sensitivity for honest and dishonest signals— but in the ab-
sence of barriers, a restraint may lead only to further exploitative 
strategies developed by cheaters.
Red Queen- like coevolutionary relationships in nonhuman ani-
mals determine how barriers to exploitation and within- group sub-
version evolve in social groups. Some nonhuman animal populations 
are, for example, observed punishing dishonest signalers. Bachmann 
et al. (2017) show that even the potential of dishonest signaling can 
be costly; in the cichlid fish Neolamprologus brichardi, unreliable 
signalers— who misrepresent messages using facial color patterns— 
tend to be punished, leading to “social policing” that helps to support 
a cooperative breeding system; policing, in this case, is an example 
of a socially created restraint, as potential punishment deters but 
probably cannot entirely prevent exploitation. Tibbetts and Dale 
(2004) come to similar conclusions among paper wasps on the basis 
of experimental manipulation of the signal.
Territorial defense of breeding grounds by males may serve as a 
barrier to mating by competing males when the competitors have not 
evolved an alternative mating strategy. An alternative mating strategy 
represents circumvention of the barrier. In centrarchid sunfish Lepomis 
macrochirus, for example, small males avoid male expulsion and thus 
gain mating access to females on the territories of males by mimick-
ing females (Dominey, 1980; Phillipp & Gross, 1994). In other cases, the 
extent to which the barrier of territory defense has been evaded is less 
clear. In red- winged blackbirds, (Agelaius phoeniceus), female mimicry 
has not been clearly established. Subadult males, however, have color-
ation that resembles females, though it is often intermediate between 
the most brightly colored females and the far more brightly colored 
adult males. Presentation of a mounted specimen of one such inter-
mediately colored subadult male elicited an intense courtship display 
from the territory owner (Rohwer, 1978), indicating that the territorial 
defense response has been countered by subadult males. Whether the 
subadult males might gain immediate mating benefits (as is the case with 
L. macrochirus) or the more long- term advantages (such as a toe- hole in 
territory establishment) from the apparent female mimicry is unclear.
Genetic testing to assess whether extra- pair copulations con-
tribute genetically to offspring might help clarify whether terri-
torial barriers have been evaded. When extra- pair copulations do 
not occur, territorial defense can be considered a barrier and selec-
tion for coevolutionary changes in territoriality would be lessened, 
though other factors may contribute to the absence of extra- pair 
copulations. The pervasiveness of extra- pair copulations among 
species with breeding territories (Brouwer & Griffith, 2019) suggests 
that territorial barriers are often circumvented and that intraspecific 
coevolutionary effects on territorial defenders and sneaky copula-
tors will keep occurring.
Territorial defense also extends to the level of the colony. 
Previous work suggests that nonhuman animals use signals (odors 
or sounds) to prevent conspecific noncolony members from entering 
a protected colony in both Hymenoptera and mole rate populations 
(Barker et al., 2021; Queller and Strassmann, 2002). If the signal de-
tection system prevents unrelated individuals from gaining access to 
the colony, the defense is a barrier; if it reduces but does not prevent 
access, it is a restraint.
6  |  HUMAN POPUL ATIONS
Behavioral patterns in human cultures can be exploited for Darwinian 
purposes (Foley and Mirazón Lahr, 2011). We propose, in line with 
Dawkins and Krebs’s (1978) discussion of the relationship between 
“mind- readers” and “manipulators,” that individuals in human so-
cieties will continuously develop strategies for both creating and 
avoiding barriers and restraints to exploitation. The forms these 
strategies take will depend both on population size and on receiver 
psychology, which develops because of both intrinsic and culturally 
learned biases (Soler et al., 2014). In human societies, where cultural 
information— maladaptive or otherwise— may travel quickly (Enquist 
et al., 2002), disequilibrium between competitors is likely to be com-
mon (Soler et al., 2014).
The full extent of human- imposed barriers and restraints to 
exploitation is obviously too large to discuss here, but we believe 
that they range across cultures and relationships and that language 
in particular provides strategic individuals with virtually unlimited 
mechanisms for exploiting their own societies (Cronk, 1994). Some 
strategies that do not rely on language, however, may be universal 
among humans. For example, in a parallel way to begging in bird 
species, Lummaa et al. (1998) suggested that human infants may cry 
more vigorously to signal hardiness (Furlow, 1997) or to exploit pa-
rental caregiving. Because there is frequently a conflict between the 
desired level of care of offspring and the optimal amount of care 
required from a parent for ensuring the offspring's reproductive suc-
cess, vigorous crying may be an exploitative measure for manipulat-
ing parents, or to outcompete potential siblings.
Within particular cultures, the mechanisms for thwarting ex-
ploitation will determine the most likely strategies individuals will 
develop to exploit others and their societies— a fact that may help to 
predict cultural exploitation before it takes place. The classic exam-
ple of exploited reciprocity from Mauss (1925) shows that gift- giving 
and reciprocity among the Maori is used for personal or familial 
gain: Individuals are known to provide gifts they know cannot be 
reciprocated. Assuming the custom was introduced as a mechanism 
to prevent free riding among Maori families, the strategy of over- 
generosity to actively prevent reciprocity, and thereby damage a 
family's reputation, is a novel behavior that avoids the custom that 
may have previously functioned as a barrier to exploitation.
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Numerous empirical studies and models reveal mechanisms 
for preventing exploitation associated with gift- giving practices 
in hunter- gatherer societies. Cronk (1989) distinguishes several 
hunter- gatherer practices from the ostensibly “no- strings attached” 
gift- giving relationships seen in Western cultures. One practice that 
may be unusually effective at blocking exploitation is the “osotua” 
of Maasai pastoralists (Jacobs, 1965; Spencer, 1965); modeled by 
Aktipis et al. (2011). Osotua (translating literally to “umbilical cord”) 
relationships are all need- based: individuals in need ask for help 
from those with resources, and those with resources give only so 
much as is needed. Models suggest that the osotua practice leads to 
longer group viability than does individual- or nonneed- based pas-
toral systems. Cronk (2007) interviewed Maasai pastoralists about 
the behaviors that may lead to ending an osotua relationship, which 
included lying about needs, or lying about the resources one has to 
give. Interviewees added, however, that cheating in osotua relation-
ships was “unthinkable.”
Numerous other examples, both in ethnographic data, labora-
tory experiments, and analytic and agent- based models, suggest 
that social policing in humans, whether in the form of altruistic pun-
ishment and strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 
2000; also see Wiessner, 2005 for a case study in the Ju/’hoansi 
bushmen) through conditional cooperation via tag- based signaling 
(Bruner, 2021; Riolo et al., 2001), or the evolution of social norms 
(Fehr & Schurtenberger, 2018), may have been important for main-
taining social cohesion throughout our evolutionary history (Barclay, 
2004; Barclay, 2013; Bliege Bird & Power, 2015; Gintis et al., 2001; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). These findings have led to support for 
the cultural group selection hypothesis (see Henrich, 2004; Henrich 
& Henrich, 2007; Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021), which empha-
sizes the importance of group cohesion, altruistic punishment, and 
social norms for survival in between- group competition and war-
fare, though Alexander (1985) develops a similar account without 
assuming intragroup cohesion. While these positions undoubtedly 
give proximate accounts for how barriers and restraints against ex-
ploitation— in the form of social norms, policing, and shared interest 
in group survival— prevent within- group subversion, the possibility 
of novel strategies for exploiting one's own group by compromising 
such barriers and restraints needs to be assessed.
Across human populations and cultures, we believe that the pos-
sibility of novel strategies suggests that any barrier may become a 
restraint— or may fail to protect against exploitation altogether. The 
ingenuity of exploitative methods humans develop suggests that 
mechanisms for promoting group cohesion are not universally effec-
tive, even among successful groups. This is seen across societies, 
from hunter- gatherer groups to urban cities.1 It may be, however, 
that social norms and socially transmitted beliefs about norms, as 
alluded to by the interviewee in the osotua system, can function as a 
barrier: Those who believe it is wrong to exploit others will not do so 
(for a discussion, see Gordon & Frank, 1990). Studies of human reli-
gions as signaling systems (see Irons, 2001; Sosis, 2003; Sosis & 
Alcorta, 2003) suggest, moreover, that communal belief and ritual 
helps to maintain cohesion and cooperation in human societies. In 
large societies, however, elites may exploit religious systems to con-
trol fellow adherents (Johnson, 2005), leading to an increase in reli-
gious skepticism (Cronk, 1994; Soler et al., 2014). Soler et al. (2014) 
argue that such skepticism will, in turn, lead exploiters of these sys-
tems to intensify manipulation of receiver psychology through a va-
riety of signals. It may therefore be the case that larger, stratified 
societies are at an overall greater risk of being in disequilibrium, 
while in smaller societies, or smaller facets of larger societies, arms 
races may lead to barriers that put a cultural version of the Red 
Queen on hold, at least temporarily.
Features of language make clear, furthermore, the nuanced ways 
that the coevolutionary interaction between exploiters and honest 
signalers can drive complexity. For example, ubiquity of dialects and 
accents (Cohen, 2012), and the direct link between these features and 
individual preferences toward others (Anisfeld et al., 1962; Moffett, 
2013), even from a very young age (Kinzler et al., 2007, 2009), sug-
gests that vocal qualities are used for assortative cooperation (Cohen, 
2012; Cohen and Haun, 2013; McElreath et al., 2003). Mimicry of 
these features may, furthermore, have selected both for a stronger 
ability to detect mimicry and for the use of signals that are more 
difficult to fake, both of which present a restraint against exploita-
tion (Cohen, 2012). To the extent that mimics succeed, the defenses 
against mimicry will be restraints rather than barriers to exploitation.
Given that this potential mechanism for exploiting group pref-
erences does not rely on the use of words with meaning, it is likely 
that strategies individuals may use complex language to evade or 
attenuate barriers and restraints to exploitation across cultures. This 
accords with the view that tactical deception or Machiavellian in-
telligence has been an essential factor in the evolution of primate 
intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Humphrey, 1976). As mecha-
nisms for deception and exploitation are ubiquitous, including in 
modern societies (Boyd & Mathew, 2015; Henrich, 2020; McNally 
et al., 2012), we suggest, following the notion that complex cognition 
permits more sophisticated strategies of exploitation, that applying 
barrier theory to human cultures helps to predict and expose such 
strategies as novel barriers for prevention are implemented.
7  |  PUT TING THE RED QUEEN ON HOLD
We suggest that the above review shows how barrier theory can 
apply to different types of exploitative systems; barriers can cause 
the Red Queen to rest, but novel strategies can overcome barriers 
and cause her to start moving again. The mechanisms for preventing 
exploitation and the ways a barrier can be overcome are determined 
by the system in question. In each of these examples, the relatively 
rapid evolution of germs and cancers permits the invading organism 
 1Modern crime studies have started to make use of evolutionary reasoning in prevention 
work. Ekblom (1999), for example, has used the notion of coevolutionary struggle to 
emphasize changes in criminal tactics in the United Kingdom. He notes that, as new 
mechanisms to prevent crime are introduced, novel criminal behaviors inevitably 
develop; evolutionary insights from barrier theory can, therefore, help those involved in 
crime prevention to predict novel criminal tactics. Islam et al., (2019) extend this idea to 
security issues in technology.
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or growth to evade natural barriers. In the case of many cancers, 
tumor suppressor genes and cell adhesion may prevent oncogenesis 
unless countered by mutations or pathogens; in the case of infec-
tious disease, germ evolution can lead to properties that allow an 
infectious organism to overcome the host's immune system; among 
animal populations, tactics, such as mimicry, are employed to over-
come mechanisms that otherwise block exploitation. But selection, 
whether natural or cultural, determines whether and how barriers 
form— and how they are overcome.
In each of these examples, some exploiters are able to use methods 
for overcoming characteristics that are barriers to other exploiters. A 
commonality is heterogeneity among exploiters. Tumors, for example, 
rely on heterogeneity to proliferate: Once formed, the immune system 
and artificial treatments are not always effective for curing cancer, as 
the assaults on the disease select for cells naturally resistant to a par-
ticular therapy. High heterogeneity virtually guarantees the successful 
exploitation of the body, as even a single cancer clone with natural 
resistance may divide uncontrollably (Dey et al., 2017).
If it is possible that unknown strategies can be developed and 
used when rules are not strictly limited— unlike those seen in models 
of signaling games— then it is possible that, in any particular real- 
world competitive relationship, one party will be exploited in an un-
foreseeable way, disrupting the potential for evolutionary stability. 
As barriers are generated in response to past exploitation strategies, 
exploiters who develop novel strategies for overcoming barriers to 
exploitation will have a fitness advantage; this may explain the evo-
lution of the ability to overcome barriers by novel means, which can 
affect the trajectory of Red Queen- like relationships: Unexpected 
strategies may allow one side to exploit the other, putting on hold, or 
perhaps ending entirely the coevolutionary relationship. In this way, 
barrier theory reveals how and why coevolutionary struggle devel-
ops into evolutionary stability, and vice versa.
Barrier theory emphasizes that the Red Queen stops running 
when an effective barrier evolves and further that this principle 
holds across populations and environments where exploitative re-
lationships exist. Coevolutionary struggle resumes if the exploiter 
breaks through the barrier to transform it into a restraint. The Red 
Queen may never fully stop if the barrier- breaking variant is present 
in at least one individual in the population of adversaries. If it is ab-
sent and each adversary is entirely dependent on the exploitation, 
the Red Queen stops running. This elimination of the exploitation, 
however, may be temporary if the adversary has others to exploit 
(e.g., other species), in which case there is a reservoir from which 
new exploiters may return with new characteristics that release 
them from being blocked by the barrier, causing the Red Queen to 
start running again. As discussed above for plant secondary com-
pounds, however, the fact that the Red Queen may be perpetually 
on the run with some adversaries does not negate the fact that she 
may be able to stop running permanently against most of the po-
tential adversaries, when they are blocked by a generally effective 
barrier.
We suggest, finally, that viewing coevolutionary struggles from 
the systems- view of barrier theory reveals how innovative strategies 
may evolve to evade barriers and overcome restraints. This is be-
cause barriers and restraints reveal what strategies cannot be used, 
guiding the observer about what novel strategies may be developed 
(Table 1). Mimicry of honest signals and deception are, we hypothe-
size, common strategies for overcoming barriers in both natural and 
social systems. Future work, both modeling and empirical, should 
show the extent to which the principles of barrier theory hold across 
ecological and cultural environments and predict what strategies 
are likely to be developed to overcome mechanisms that thwart sys-
temic exploitation.
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TA B L E  1  Summary of barriers and restraints that evolve through natural selection





Cancer; parasitism Cell cycle arrest; cell suicide; cell 
adhesion; p53 protein
Slow division of dividing 
cells; restricted blood 
flow
Humans Plasmodium agents of 
malaria
Parasitism Duffy antigen receptor mutations; 
vaccination
Sickle cell anemia
Pine trees Pine beetles Herbivory Secondary compounds that completely 
deter herbivores
Defensive chemicals 
(can be exploited by 
competitors)
Birds Dishonest signaler 
chicks
Competition for parental 
care
Universal recognition of dishonest 











Complete deterrence of deceptive 
signalers by aggression






Access to colony by 
genetically unrelated 
individuals
Competition for colony 
resources
Elimination of unrelated individuals by 
aggression
Partial deterrence of 
unrelated individuals 
by aggression
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P. vivax was probably eliminated prehistorically from West Africa in 
response to the near fixation of the Duffy antigen receptor mutation.
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